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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a single-agent modal logic framework for rea-
soning about goal-direct “knowing how” based on ideas from linguistics, philosophy,
modal logic and automated planning. We first define a modal language to express
“I know how to guarantee ϕ given ψ” with a semantics not based on standard epis-
temic models but labelled transition systems that represent the agent’s knowledge of
his own abilities. A sound and complete proof system is given to capture the valid
reasoning patterns about “knowing how” where the most important axiom suggests
its compositional nature.
1 Introduction1
1.1 Background: beyond “knowing that”.
VonWright and Hinttika laid out the syntactic and semantic foundations of epistemic logic
respectively in their seminal works [1] and [2]. The standard picture of epistemic logic
usually consists of: a modal language which can express “an agent knows that ϕ”; a Kripke
semantics incarnates the slogan “knowledge (information) as elimination of uncertainty”;
a proof system syntactically characterizes a normal modal logic somewhere between S4
and S5 subjective to different opinions about the so-called introspection axioms. Despite
the suspicions from philosophers in its early days, the past half-century has witnessed
the blossom of this logical investigation of propositional knowledge with applications in
epistemology, theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, economics, and many
other disciplines besides its birth place of modal logic.2
However, the large body of research on epistemic logic mainly focuses on propositional
knowledge expressed by “knowing that ϕ”, despite the fact that in everyday life knowl-
edge is expressed by also “knowing how”, “knowing why”, “knowing what”, “knowing
whether”, and so on (knowing?X below for brevity). Linguistically, these expressions of
knowledge share the common form consisting of the verb “know” followed by some em-
bedded questions.3 It is natural to assign a high-level uniform truth condition for these
⋆ The author thanks Frank Veltman for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
The author is also gratful to the support from NSSF key projects 12&ZD119 and 15AZX020.
1 To impatient technical readers: this rather philosophical introduction will help you to know how
the formalism works in the later sections. A bit of philosophy can lead us further.
2 For an excellent survey of the early history of epistemic logic, see [3, Chapter 2]. For a contem-
porary comprehensive introduction to its various topics, see [4].
3 There is a cross-lingual fact: such knowing?X sentences become meaningless if the verb “know” is
replaced by “believe”, e.g., I believe how to swim. This may shed some shadow on philosophers’
usual conception of knowledge in terms of strengthened belief. Linguistically, this phenomenon
occurs to many other verbs which can be roughly categorized using factivity, cf., e.g, [5].
knowledge expressions in terms of knowing an answer of the corresponding question [6].
In fact, in the early days of epistemic logic, Hinttika has elaborate discussions on know-
ing?X and its relation with questions in terms of first-order modal logic [2], which also
shapes his later work on Socratic Epistemology [7]. For example, “knowing who Frank
is” is rendered as ∃xK(Frank = x) in [2]. However, partly because of the then-infamous
philosophical and technical issues regarding the foundation of first-order modal logic
(largely due to Quine), the development of epistemic logics beyond “knowing that” was
hindered.4 In the seminal work [10], the first-order epistemic logic is just briefly touched
without specific discussion of those expressions using different embedded questions. A
promising recent approach is based on inquisitive semantics where propositions may have
both informative content and inquisitive content (cf. e.g.,[11]). An inquisitive epistemic
logic which can handle “knowing that” and “knowing whether” is proposed in [12].
Departing from the linguistically motivated compositional analysis on knowing?X,
some researchers took a knowing?X construction as a whole, and introduce a new modal-
ity instead of breaking it down by allowing quantifiers, equalities and other logical con-
stants to occur freely in the language [13,14,15]. For example, “knowing what a password
is” is rendered by “Kv password” in [13] instead of ∃xK password = x, where Kv is the
new modality. This move seems promising since by restricting the language we may avoid
some philosophical issues of first-order modal logic, retain the decidability of the logic,
and focus on special logical properties of each particular knowing-?X construction at a
high abstraction level. A recent line of work results from this idea [16,17,18,19,20]. Be-
sides the evident non-nomality of the resulting logics,5 a ‘signature’ technical difficulty in
such an approach is the apparent mismatch of syntax and semantics: the modal language
is relatively weak compared to the models which contain enough information to facilitate
a reasonable semantics of knowing?X, and this requires new techniques.
1.2 Knowing how
Among all the knowing?X expressions, the most discussed one in philosophy and AI
is “knowing how”. Indeed, it sounds the most distant from propositional knowledge
(knowledge-that): knowing how to swim seems distinctly different from knowing that
it is raining outside. One question that keeps philosophers busy is whether knowledge-
how (the knowledge expressed by “knowing how”) is reducible to knowledge-that. Here
philosophers split into two groups: the intellectualists who think knowledge-how is a sub-
species of knowledge-that (e.g., [21]), and the anti-intellectuallists who do not think so
(e.g., [22]). The anti-intellectualism may win your heart at the first glance by equating
knowledge-how to certain ability, but the linguistically and logically well-versed intel-
lectualists may have their comebacks at times (think about the previously mentioned
interpretation of knowing?X as knowing an answer).6 In AI, starting from the early days
4 Nevertheless Hintikka addressed some of those issues about first-order modal logic insightfully
in the context of epistemic logic, see, e.g., a wonderful survey paper [8]. Many of those issues
are also elegantly addressed in intensional first-order modal logic cf. e.g., [9].
5 For example, knowing whether p → q and knowing whether p together does not entail knowing
whether q. Likewise, knowing how to p and knowing how to q does not entail knowing how to
p∧q. Moreover, you may not know why a tautology is a tautology which contradicts necessitation.
6 See [23] for a survey of the debate. A comprehensive collection of the related papers (200+) can
be found at http://philpapers.org/browse/knowledge-how, edited by John Bengson.
[24,25,26], people have been studying about representation and reasoning of procedural
knowledgewhich is often treated as synonym for knowledge-how in AI, in particular about
knowledge-how based on specifiable procedures such as coming out of a maze or winning
a game. However, there is no common consensus on how to capture the logic of “knowing
how” formally (cf. the excellent surveys [27,28]). In this paper we presents an attempt to
formalize an important kind of “knowing how” and lay out its logic foundation, inspired
by the aforementioned perspectives of linguistics, philosophy, and AI.
Some clarifications have to be made before mentioning our ideas and their sources:
– We will focus on the logic of goal-direct “knowing how” as Gochet puts it [27], such
as knowing how to prove a theorem, how to open the door, how to bake a cake, and
how to cure the disease, i.e., linguistically, mainly about knowing how followed by a
achievement verb or an accomplishment verb according to the classification of Vendler
[29].7 On the other hand, we will not talk about the following “knowing how”: I
know how the computer works (explanation), I know how happy she is (degree of
emotion), I know how to speak English (rule-direct) and so on.
– The goal of this paper is not to address the philosophical debate between intellec-
tualism and anti-intellectualism which we did discuss in [30,31]. However, to some
extent, we are inspired by the ideas from both stands, and combine them in the formal
work which may in turn shed new light on this philosophical issue. 8
– We focus on the single-agent case without probability, as the first step.
1.3 Basic ideas behind the syntax and semantics
Different from the cases on “knowing whether” and “knowing what”, there is nothing
close to a consensus on what would be the syntax and semantics of the logic of “knowing
how”. Various attempts were made using Situation Calculus, ATL, or STIT logic to ex-
press different versions of “knowing how”, cf. e.g., [26,32,33,34,35,27]. However, as we
mentioned before, we do not favour a compositional analysis using powerful logical lan-
guages. Instead, we would like to take the “knowing how” construction as a single (and
only) modality in our language. It seems natural to introduce a modality Khϕ to express
the goal-direct “knowing how to achieve the goal ϕ”. It sounds similar to “having the abil-
ity to achieve the goal ϕ”, as many anti-intellectualists would agree. It seems harmless to
go one step further as in the AI literature to interpret this type of “knowing how” as that
the agent can achieve ϕ. However, it is crucial to note the following problems of such an
anti-intelectualistic ability account:
1. Knowing how to achieve a goal may not entail that you can realize the goal now. For
example, as intellectualists would remark, a broken-arm pianist may still know how
to play piano even if he cannot play right now, and a chef may still know how to make
cakes even when the sugar is run out (cf. e.g., [21]).
7 Here knowing how to maintain something or to do an activity (like swimming) are not typical
examples for our treatment, although we hope our formalism captures some common features
shared also by them. As discussed in [27], “knowing how” plus activities, though more philo-
sophically interesting, is less demanding in logic rendering than others.
8 Our logic is more about knowing how than knowledge-how though they are clearly related and
often discussed interchangeably in the philosophy literature. The full nature of knowledge-how
may not be revealed by the inference structure of the linguistic construction of knowing how.
2. Even when you have the ability to win a lottery by luckily buying the right ticket (and
indeed win it in the end), it does not mean you know how to win the lottery, since
you cannot guarantee the result (cf. e.g., [36]).
To reconcile our intuition about the ability involved in “knowing how” and the first prob-
lem above, it is observed in [30] that “knowing how” expressions in context often come
with implicit preconditions.9 For example, when you claim that you know how to go to the
city center of Taipei from the airport, you are talking about what you can do under some
implicit preconditions: e.g., the public transportation is still running or there is no strike
of the taxi drivers. Likewise, it sounds all right to say that you know how to bake a cake
even when you do not have all the ingredients right now: you can do it given you have all
the ingredients. In our logical language, we make such context-dependent preconditions
explicit by introducing the modality Kh(ψ, ϕ) expressing that the agent knows how to
achieve ϕ given the precondition ψ.10 Actually, we used a similar conditional knowing
what operator in [17] to capture the conditional knowledge such as “I would know what
my password for this website is, given it is 4-digit” (since I only have one 4-digit password
ever).11 In [17], this conditionaliztion proved to be also useful to encode the potential
dynamics of knowledge. We will come back to this at the end of the paper.
Now, to reconcile the intuition of ability with the second problem above, we need to
interpret the ability more precisely to exclude the lucky draws. Our main idea comes from
conformant planning in AI which is exactly about how to achieve a goal by a linear plan
which can never fail given some initial uncertainty (cf. e.g., [39]). For example (taken
from [40,41]), consider the following map of a floor, and suppose that you know you are
at a place marked by p but do not know exactly where you are. Do you know how to
reach a safe place (marked by q)?
Example 1.
s6 s7 : q s8 : q
s1 r // s2 : p r //
u
OO
s3 : p r //
u
OO
s4 : q r //
u
OO
s5
❴
✔
❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴
✤
❚
✤✤ ✤✤✤
❚❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴❴ ✔
It is not hard to see that there exists a plan to guarantee your safety from any place
marked by p, which is to move r first then move u. On the contrary, the plan rr and the
plan umay fail sometimes depending on where you are actually. The locations in the map
can be viewed as states of affairs and the labelled directional edges between the states
can encode your own “knowledge” of the available actions and their effects.12 Intuitively,
to know how to achieve ϕ requires that you can guarantee ϕ. Consider the following
examples which represent the agent’s knowledge about his own abilities.
9 Such conditions are rarely discussed in the philosophical literature of “knowing how” with few
exceptions such as [37].
10 By using the condition, one can be said to know better how to swim than another if he can do it
in a more hostile environment (thus weakening the condition) [30]
11 Such conditionals are clearly not simple (material) implications and they are closely related to
conditional probability and conditional belief (cf. e.g., [38]).
12 The agent may have more abilities de facto than what he may realize. It is important to make sure
the agent can knowingly guarantee the goal in terms of the ability he is aware of, cf. [24,34,28].
Example 2.
s2 b // s4 : q
s1 : p
a❥❥
55❥❥❥
a
❚❚
))❚❚❚
s3
s1 : p a // s3 b // s5 : q
s2 : p b // s4 a // s6 : q
The graph on the left denotes that you know you can do a at the p-state s1 but you are
not sure what the consequence is: it may lead to either s2 or s3, and the exact outcome
is out of your control. Therefore, this action is non-deterministic to you. In this case, ab is
not a good plan since it may fail to be executable. Thus it sounds unreasonable to claim
that you know how to reach q given p. Now consider the graph on the right. Let ab and
ba be two treatments for the same symptom p depending on the exact cause (s1 or s2).
As a doctor, it is indeed true that you can cure the patient (to achieve q) if you are told
the exact cause. However, responsible as you are, can you say you know how to cure
the patient given only the symptom p? A wrong treatment may kill the patient. These
planning examples suggest the following truth condition for the modal formula Kh(ψ, ϕ)
w.r.t. a graph-like model representing the agent’s knowledge about his or her abilities
(available actions and their possibly non-deterministic effects):
There exists a sequence σ of actions such that from all the ψ-states in the graph,
σ will always succeed in reaching ϕ-states.
Note that the nesting structure of quantifiers in the above truth condition is ∃∀∀.13 The
first ∃ fixes a unique sequence, the first ∀ checks all the possible states satisfying the
condition ψ, and the second ∀ make sure the goal is guaranteed.
There are several points to be highlighted: 1. ∃ cannot be swapped with the first ∀:
see the discussion about the second graph in Example 2, which amounts to the distinction
between de re and de dicto in the setting of “knowing how” (cf. also [26,35,33,28] and
uniform strategies in imperfect information games); 2. There is no explicit “knowing
that” in the above truth condition, which differs from the truth conditions advocated
by intellectualism [43] and the linguistically motivated ∃xKϕ(x) rendering.14 On the
other hand, the graph model represents the agent’s knowledge of his actions and their
effects (cf. [44]). 3. The truth condition is based on a Kripke-like model without epistemic
relations as in the treatment of (imperfect) procedure information in [44]. As it will
become more clear later on, it is not necessary to go for neighbourhood or topological
models to accommodate non-normal modal logics if the truth condition of the modality is
non-standard (cf. also [45,19,16]); 4. Finally, our interpretation of “knowing how” does
not fit the standard scheme “knowledge as elimination of uncertainty”, and it is not about
possible worlds indistinguishable from the “real world”. The truth of Kh(ψ, ϕ) does not
depend on the actual world: it is “global” in nature.
In the next section, we will flesh out the above ideas in precise definitions and proofs:
first a simple formal language, then the semantics based on the idea of planning, and
13 In [42], the author introduced a modality for can ϕ with the following ∃∀ schema over neigh-
bourhood models: there is a relevant cluster of possible worlds (as the outcomes of an action)
where ϕ is true in all of them.
14 This also distinguishes this work from our earlier philosophical discussion [30] where intellectu-
alism was defended by giving an ∃xKϕ(x)-like truth condition informally.
finally a sound and complete proof system. We hope our formal theory can clarify the
above informal ideas further. In the last section, we summarize our novel ideas beyond
the standard schema of epistemic logic, and point out many future directions.
2 The logic
Definition 1. Given a set of proposition letters P, the language LKh is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kh(ϕ, ϕ)
where p ∈ P. As discussed in the previous section, Kh(ψ, ϕ) expresses that the agent knows
how to achieve ϕ given ψ.We use the standard abbreviations⊥, ϕ∨ψ and ϕ→ ψ, and define
Uϕ as Kh(¬ϕ,⊥). The meaning of U will become more clear after the semantics is defined.
Definition 2. Given the set of proposition letters P and a countable non-empty set of action
symbols Σ. An ability map is essentially a labelled transition system (S,R,V) where:
– S is a non-empty set of states;
– R : Σ→ 2S×S is a collection of transitions labelled by actions in Σ;
– V : S → 2P is a valuation function.
We write s
a
→ t if (s, t) ∈ R(a). For a sequence σ = a1 . . . an ∈ Σ
∗, we write s
σ
→ t if there
exist s2 . . . sn such that s
a1→ s2
a2→ · · ·
an−1
→ sn
an→ t. Note that σ can be the empty sequence
ǫ (when n = 0), and we set s
ǫ
→ s for any s. Let σk be the initial segment of σ up to ak for
k ≤ |σ|. In particular let σ0 = ǫ. We say that σ = a1 . . . an is strongly executable at s if: for
any 0 ≤ k < n and any t, s
σk→ t implies that t has at least one ak+1-successor. It is not hard
to see that if σ is strongly executable at s then it is executable at s, i.e., s
σ
→ t for some t.
Note that, according to our above definition, ab is not strongly executable from s1 in
the left-hand-side model of Example 2, since s3 has no b-successor but it can be reached
from s1 by a = (ab)1.
Definition 3 (Semantics of LKh).
M, s  ⊤ always
M, s  p⇔ p ∈ V (s)
M, s  ¬ϕ⇔M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔M, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ
M, s  Kh(ψ, ϕ)⇔ there exists a σ ∈ Σ∗ such that for all s′ such thatM, s′  ψ :
σ is strongly executable at s′ and for all t such that s′
σ
→ t,M, t  ϕ
Note that the modality Kh is not local in the sense that its truth does not depend on
the designated state where it is evaluated. Thus it either holds on all the states or none
of them. It is not hard to see that the schema of ∃∀∀ appears in the truth condition for
Kh where the last ∀ actually consists of two parts: the strong executability (there is a ∀ in
its definition) and the guarantee of the goal. These two together make sure the plan will
never fail to achieve ϕ. It is a simple exercise to see that Kh(p, q) holds in the model of
Example 1, but not in the models of Example 2. Moreover, the operator U defined by Kh
is actually a universal modality:15
M, s  Uϕ⇔ for all t ∈ S,M, t  ϕ
To see this, check the following:
M, s  Kh(¬ψ,⊥) ⇔ there exists a σ ∈ Σ∗ such that for everyM, s′  ¬ψ :
σ is strongly executable at s′ and if s′
σ
→ t then M, t  ⊥
⇔ there exists a σ ∈ Σ∗ such that for everyM, s′  ¬ψ :
σ is strongly executable at s′ and there is no t such that s′
σ
→ t
⇔ there exists a σ ∈ Σ∗ such that for everyM, s′  ¬ψ : ⊥ holds
⇔ there exists a σ ∈ Σ∗ such that there is no s′ such that M, s′ 2 ψ
⇔ for all t ∈ S ,M, t  ψ
Proposition 1. The following are valid:
1 Up ∧ U(p→ q)→ Uq 2 Kh(p, r) ∧Kh(r, q)→ Kh(p, q)
3 U(p→ q)→ Kh(p, q) 4 Up→ p
5 Kh(p, q)→ UKh(p, q) 6 ¬Kh(p, q)→ U¬Kh(p, q)
PROOF Since U is simply a universal modality 1 and 4 are obvious. 3 is due to the fact
that ǫ is allowed as a trivial plan. 5 and 6 are due to the fact that Kh is global. The only
non-trivial case is 2. Note that if there is a strongly executable sequence σ leading you
from any p-state to some r-state, and there is a strongly executable sequence η from r-
states to q-states, then ση is strongly executable from any p-state and it will make sure
that you end up with q-states from any p-state. 
The validity of (2) above actually captures the intuitive compositionality of “knowing
how”, as desired. Note that Kh(p, q) ∧ Kh(p, r)→ Kh(p, q ∧ r) is not valid, as desired.
Based on the above axioms, we propose the following proof system SKH for LKh
(where ϕ[ψ/p] is obtained by uniformly substituting p in ϕ by ψ):
System SKH
Axioms Rules
TAUT all axioms of propositional logic MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
DISTU Up ∧ U(p→ q)→ Uq NECU
ϕ
Uϕ
COMPKh Kh(p, r) ∧ Kh(r, q)→ Kh(p, q) SUB
ϕ(p)
ϕ[ψ/p]
EMP U(p→ q)→ Kh(p, q)
TU Up→ p
4KU Kh(p, q)→ UKh(p, q)
5KU ¬Kh(p, q)→ U¬Kh(p, q)
15 Note that U is a very powerful modality in its expressiveness when combined with the standard
 modality, cf. [46].
Proposition 1 plus some reflection on the usual inference rules should establish the
soundness of SKH. For completeness, we first get a taste of the deductive power of SKH
by proving the following formulas which play important roles in the later completeness
proof. In the rest of the paper we use ⊢ to denote ⊢SKH .
Proposition 2. We can derive the following in SKH (names are given to be used later):
TRI Kh(p, p)
WSKh U(p→ r) ∧ U(o→ q) ∧ Kh(r, o)→ Kh(p, q)
4U Up→ UUp
5U ¬Up→ U¬Up
COND Kh(⊥, p)
UCONJ U(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (Uϕ ∧ Uψ).
PREKh Kh(Kh(p, q) ∧ p, q).
POSTKh Kh(r,Kh(p, q) ∧ p)→ Kh(r, q)
Moreover, the following rule NECKh is admissible: ⊢ ϕ =⇒ ⊢ Kh(ψ, ϕ).
PROOF TRI is proved by applying NECU to the tautology p → p, followed by EMP. WSKh
says if you weaken the goal and strengthen the condition you still know how. It is proved
by applying EMP to U(p → r) and U(o → q) followed by applying COMPKh twice. 4U and
5U are special cases of 4KU and 5KU respectively since Uψ := Kh(¬ψ,⊥). Since ⊥ → p is a
tautology, we can apply NECU and EMP to obtain COND. UCONJ is a standard exercise for a
normal modality. Interestingly, PREKh says that you know how to guarantee q given both p
and the fact that you know how to guarantee q given p. It can be proved by distinguishing
two cases: Kh(p, q) and ¬Kh(p, q), and use COND and WSKh respectively under the help of
NECU. POSTKh can be proved easily based on COMPKh and PREKh. It says that you know how
to achieve q given r if you know how to achieve a state where you know how to continue
to achieve q.16 Finally NECKh is the necessitation rule forKhwhich can be derived by start-
ing with the tautology ψ → ϕ (given ⊢ ϕ) followed by the applications of NECU and EMP. 
Remark 1. From the above proposition and the system SKH, we see that U is indeed an
S5modality which can be considered as a version of “knowing that”: you know that ϕ iff it
holds on all the relevant possible states under the current restriction of attention (not just
the epistemic alternatives to the actual one). The difference is that here the knowledge-
that expressed by Uϕ refers to the “background knowledge” that you take for granted for
now, rather than contingent but epistemically true facts in the standard epistemic logic.
Another interesting thing to notice is that WSKh actually captures an important connection
between “knowing that” and “knowing how”, e.g., you know how to cure a disease if you
know that it is of a certain type and you know how to cure this type of the disease in
general. We will come back to the relation between “knowing how” and “knowing that”
at the end of the paper.
It is crucial to establish the following replacement rule to ease the later proofs.
Proposition 3. The replacement of equivalents (⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ =⇒ ⊢ χ ↔ χ[ψ/ϕ])17 is an
admissible rule in SKH.
16 This is an analog of a requirement of the modality Can in [26].
17 Here the substitution can apply to some (not necessarily all) of the occurrences.
PROOF It becomes a standard exercise in modal logic if we can prove that the following
two rules are admissible in SKH:
⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ =⇒ ⊢ Kh(ψ, χ)↔ Kh(ϕ, χ), ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ =⇒ ⊢ Kh(χ, ψ)↔ Kh(χ, ϕ).
Actually we can derive (all the instances of) these two rules as follows (we only show the
first one since the second one is similar.):
1 ψ ↔ ϕ assumed
2 ϕ→ ψ 1, TAUT
3 U(ϕ→ ψ) NECU
4 Kh(ϕ, ψ) MP(EMP, 3)
5 Kh(ψ, χ)→ Kh(ϕ, ψ) 4, TAUT
6 Kh(ψ, χ)→ (Kh(ϕ, ψ) ∧ Kh(ψ, χ)) 5, TAUT
7 Kh(ϕ, ψ) ∧ Kh(ψ, χ)→ Kh(ϕ, χ) COMPKh, SUB
8 Kh(ψ, χ)→ Kh(ϕ, χ) MP(6, 7)
9 Kh(ϕ, χ)→ Kh(ψ, χ) symmetric version of 2-8
10 Kh(ψ, χ)↔ Kh(ϕ, χ) TAUT

In the rest of the paper we often use the above rule of replacement implicitly.
Here are some notions before we prove the completeness. Given a set of LKh formulas
∆, let ∆|Kh be the collection of its Kh formulas:
∆|Kh = {χ | χ = Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆}.
Similarly, let ∆|¬Kh be the following collection:
∆|¬Kh = {χ | χ = ¬Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆}.
Now for each maximal consistent set of LKh formulas we build a canonical model.
Definition 4. Given a maximal consistent set Γ w.r.t. SKH, let ΣΓ = {〈ψ, ϕ〉 | Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈
Γ}, the canonical model for Γ isMcΓ = 〈S
c
Γ ,R
c,Vc〉 where:
– ScΓ = {∆ | ∆ is a maximal consistent set w.r.t. SKH and Γ |Kh = ∆|Kh};
– ∆
〈ψ,ϕ〉
−→ c Θ iff Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ Γ ,ψ ∈ ∆, and ϕ ∈ Θ;
– p ∈ V c(∆) iff p ∈ ∆.
Clearly Γ is a state inMcΓ . We say that ∆ ∈ S
c
Γ is a ϕ-state if ϕ ∈ ∆.
The following two propositions are immediate:
Proposition 4. For any∆,∆′ in ScΓ , anyKh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ LKh,Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆ iffKh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆
′
iff Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ Γ.
Proposition 5. If ∆
〈ψ,ϕ〉
−→ Θ for some ∆,Θ ∈ ScΓ then ∆
〈ψ,ϕ〉
→ Θ′ for any Θ′ such that
ϕ ∈ Θ′.
Now we prove a crucial proposition to be used later.
Proposition 6. If ϕ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ ScΓ then Uϕ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ S
c
Γ .
PROOF Suppose ϕ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ ScΓ , then by the definition of S
c
Γ , ¬ϕ is not con-
sistent with Γ |Kh ∪ Γ |¬Kh, for otherwise Γ |Kh ∪ Γ |¬Kh ∪ {¬ϕ} can be extended into a
maximal consistent set in ScΓ due to a standard Lindenbaum-like argument. Thus there
are Kh(ψ1, ϕ1), . . . , Kh(ψk, ϕk) ∈ Γ |Kh and ¬Kh(ψ
′
1, ϕ
′
1), . . . , ¬Kh(ψ
′
l , ϕ
′
l) ∈ Γ |¬Kh such
that
⊢
∧
1≤i≤k
Kh(ψi, ϕi) ∧
∧
1≤j≤l
¬Kh(ψ′j , ϕ
′
j)→ ϕ.
By NECU,
⊢ U(
∧
1≤i≤k
Kh(ψi, ϕi) ∧
∧
1≤j≤l
¬Kh(ψ′j , ϕ
′
j)→ ϕ).
By DISTU we have:
⊢ U(
∧
1≤i≤k
Kh(ψi, ϕi) ∧
∧
1≤j≤l
¬Kh(ψ′j , ϕ
′
j))→ Uϕ.
Since Kh(ψ1, ϕ1), . . . , Kh(ψk, ϕk) ∈ Γ |Kh, we have UKh(ψ1, ϕ1), . . . , UKh(ψk, ϕk) ∈ Γ
due to 4U and the fact that Γ is a maximal consistent set. Similarly, we have U¬Kh(ψ′1, ϕ
′
1),
. . . , U¬Kh(ψ′j , ϕ
′
j) ∈ Γ due to 5U. Now due to a slight generalization of UCONJ, we have:
U(
∧
1≤i≤k
Kh(ψi, ϕi) ∧
∧
1≤j≤l
¬Kh(ψ′j , ϕ
′
j)) ∈ Γ.
Now it is immediate that Uϕ ∈ Γ . Due to Proposition 4, Uϕ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ ScΓ . 
Now we are ready to establish another key proposition for the truth lemma.
Proposition 7. Suppose that there are ψ′, ϕ′ ∈ LKh such that for each ψ-state ∆ ∈ S
c
Γ we
have ∆
〈ψ′,ϕ′〉
−→ Θ for some Θ ∈ ScΓ , then U(ψ → ψ
′) ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ ScΓ .
PROOF Suppose that every ψ-state has an outgoing 〈ψ′, ϕ′〉-transition, then by the def-
inition of Rc, ψ′ is in all the ψ-states. For each ∆, either ψ 6∈ ∆ or ψ ∈ ∆ thus ψ′ ∈ ∆.
Now by the fact that ∆ is maximally consistent it is not hard to show ψ → ψ′ ∈ ∆ in both
cases. By Proposition 6, U(ψ → ψ′) ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ ScΓ . 
Now we are ready to prove the truth lemma.
Lemma 1 (Truth lemma). For any ϕ ∈ Γ :McΓ , ∆  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ ∆
PROOF Boolean cases are trivial and we only focus on the case of Kh(ψ, ϕ):.
=⇒ : If McΓ , ∆  Kh(ψ, ϕ), then according to the semantics, there exists a (possibly
empty) sequence σ ∈ ΣΓ
∗ such that for every ∆′  ψ: σ is strongly executable at ∆′ and
if ∆′
σ
→ ∆′′ thenMcΓ , ∆
′′
 ϕ. Due to the construction of Rc, there are Kh(ψ1, ϕ1), . . . ,
Kh(ψk, ϕk) in Γ such that σ = 〈ψ1, ϕ1〉 . . . 〈ψk, ϕk〉 for some k ≥ 0. If there is no ψ-state,
then by IH, ¬ψ ∈ Θ for all Θ ∈ ScΓ . By Proposition 6, U¬ψ ∈ ∆, i.e., Kh(ψ,⊥) ∈ ∆. Since
⊥ → ϕ and ψ → ψ are tautologies, by NECU, U(⊥ → ϕ) and U(ψ → ψ) are also in ∆.
Then by SUB and WSKh Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆. In the following we suppose that there exists some
ψ-state and call this assumption (◦). There are two cases to be considered:
– Suppose that k = 0, i.e, σ = ǫ: By the semantics, we have for any Θ ∈ ScΓ : Θ  ψ →
ϕ, i.e., Θ 2 ψ or Θ  ϕ. By IH, ψ 6∈ Θ or ϕ ∈ Θ. Since Θ is maximally consistent,
ψ → ϕ ∈ Θ for all Θ ∈ ScΓ . By Proposition 6, U(ψ → ϕ) ∈ Θ for all Θ ∈ S
c
Γ . By SUB
and EMP, we have Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ Θ for all Θ ∈ ScΓ , in particular, Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆.
– Suppose k > 0, recall that σm is the initial segment of σ up to 〈ψm, ϕm〉. We first
prove the following claim (⋆):
For any m ∈ [1, k]: (1) Kh(ψ, ϕm) ∈ Γ , and (2) each ϕm-state is reached via
σm from some ψ-state.
• m = 1 : Due to the semantics ofKh, each ψ-state has an outgoing 〈ψ1, ϕ1〉-
transition. By Proposition 5, each ψ-state is connected with all the ϕ1
states by 〈ψ1, ϕ1〉-transitions, which proves (2). By Proposition 7, U(ψ →
ψ1) ∈ Γ . By the definition of R
c it is clear that Kh(ψ1, ϕ1) ∈ Γ . Now by
SUB and WSKh, Kh(ψ, ϕ1) ∈ Γ .
• Suppose that the claim holds form = n−1 then we prove that it holds for
m = n as well. By IH for the above claim (⋆), we have (i)Kh(ψ, ϕn−1) ∈ Γ
and (ii) all the ϕn−1-states are reached from some ψ-state by σn−1. Since
σ is a witness of the truth of Kh(ψ, ϕ), σ is strongly executable on each
ψ-state. Now due to (ii) and the strong executability of σ, we have (iii):
each ϕn−1-state has some 〈ψn, ϕn〉-successor. By Proposition 7 we have
U(ϕn−1 → ψn) ∈ Γ . By the definition of R
c, Kh(ψn, ϕn) ∈ Γ , thus by
WSKh we have Kh(ϕn−1, ϕn) ∈ Γ . Due to (i) and COMPKh, Kh(ψ, ϕn) ∈ Γ.
Now for (2) of the claim: By (iii) and the definition of Proposition 5, each
ϕn-state is reached from some ϕn−1-state via 〈ψn, ϕn〉. Thus based on (ii)
again, we have each ϕn-state is reached from some ψ-state.
Now Claim (⋆) is proved. Let m = k, we have (1k) Kh(ψ, ϕk) ∈ Γ and (2k)
each ϕk-state is reached via σk = σ from some ψ-state (under the assumption
(◦)). Now since σ witnesses the truth of Kh(ψ, ϕ), McΓ , ∆
′
 ϕ for every ϕk-
state ∆′. By IH of the main structural induction over formulas, ϕ ∈ ∆′ for
every ∆′ such that ϕk ∈ ∆
′. Thus it is not hard to see that ϕk → ϕ is in
every state of ScΓ , for otherwise there is a state ∆
′ such that ϕk,¬ϕ ∈ ∆
′. By
Proposition 6, U(ϕk → ϕ) ∈ Γ . Thus Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ Γ due to (1k), COMPKh and
SUB. Therefore Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆ due to Proposition 4.
This completes the proof of Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆ ifMcΓ , ∆  Kh(ψ, ϕ).
Now for the other way around:
⇐=: Suppose that Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ ∆, i.e., Kh(ψ, ϕ) is in all the states ofMcΓ by Proposition 4,
we need to show thatMcΓ , ∆  Kh(ψ, ϕ). There are three cases to be considered.
– There is no Θ such that ψ ∈ Θ. By IH, there is no Θ such that McΓ , Θ  ψ then
McΓ , ∆  Kh(ψ, ϕ) trivially holds (by letting σ = ǫ as the witness).
– There are Θ,Θ′ such that ψ ∈ Θ and ϕ ∈ Θ′. Then by IH, we have McΓ , Θ  ψ and
McΓ , Θ
′
 ϕ for such Θ and Θ′. Then by the construction ofRc and IH again we know
that 〈ψ, ϕ〉 ∈ ΣΓ is strongly executable, and it will take you to states where ϕ is true
from any state where ψ is true.
– There is some Θ such that ψ ∈ Θ but no Θ such that ϕ ∈ Θ. Then it is clear that
¬ϕ ∈ Θ for all Θ ∈ ScΓ . By Proposition 6, U¬ϕ ∈ Θ for all Θ ∈ S
c
Γ . Now we have
Kh(ϕ,⊥) and Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∈ Θ thus by COMPKh Kh(ψ,⊥) ∈ Θ namely U¬ψ ∈ Θ. By TU,
¬ψ ∈ Θ for all the Θ ∈ ScΓ . However, this is contradictory to the assumption that
ψ ∈ Θ for some Θ ∈ ScΓ .
Now due to a standard Lindenbaum-like argument, each SKH-consistent set of formulas
can be extended to a maximal consistent set Γ . Due to the truth lemma,McΓ , Γ  Γ. The
completeness of SKH follows immediately.
Theorem 1. SKH is sound and strongly complete w.r.t. the class of all models.
3 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we propose and study a modal logic of goal-direct “knowing how”. The
highlights of our framework are summarized below with connections to our earlier ideas
on non-standard epistemic logics:
– The “knowing how” construction is treated as a whole similar to our works on “know-
ing whether” and “knowing what” [16,19]. We would like to keep the language neat.
– Semantically, “knowing how” is treated as a special conditional: being able to guaran-
tee a goal given a precondition, partly inspired by the conditionalization in [17].
– The ability involved is further interpreted as having a plan that never fails to achieve
the goal under the precondition, inspired by the work on conformant planning [41]
where we uses the epistemic PDL language to encode the planning problem.
– The semantics is based on labelled transition systems representing the agent’s knowl-
edge of his own abilities, inspired by the framework experimented in [44].
– Compared to the standard semantic schema of knowledge-that: true in all indistin-
guishable alternatives, our work has a more existential flavour: knowing how as hav-
ing at least one good plan. Our modal operator is not local to the indistinguishable
alternatives but it is about all the possible states even when they are distinguishable
from the current world. Thus a cook can still be said to know how to cook a certain
dish even if he knows that the ingredients are not available right now.
There are a lot more to explore. We conjecture the logic is decidable and leave the model-
theoretical issues to the full version of this paper. Moreover, it is a natural extension to
introduce the standard knowing-that operator K into the language and correspondingly
add a set E ⊆ S in the model to capture the agent’s local epistemic alternatives. Then
we can define the local version of “knowing how” Khϕ as Kψ ∧ Kh(ψ, ϕ) for some ψ.
Other obvious next steps include probabilistic and multi-agent versions of Kh. It also
makes good sense to consider group notions of “knowing how” which may bring it closer
to the framework of ATEL where a group of agents may achieve a lot more together (cf.
[28]). More generally, we may consider program-based “knowing how” where conditional
plans and iterated plans are allowed, which can be used to maintain a goal. It is also
interesting to add the dynamic operators to the picture, i.e., the public announcements
[ϕ]. In particular, it is interesting to see how new knowledge-how is obtained by learning
new knowledge-that e.g., Kh(p, q)→ [p](Up∧Kh(⊤, q))may be a desired valid formula.18
There are also interesting philosophical questions related to our formal theory. For
example, a new kind of logical omniscience may occur: if there is indeed a good plan
to achieve ϕ according to the agent’s abilities then he knows how to achieve ϕ. To the
18 Note that LKh may not have the enough pre-encoding power for announcements in itself, similar
to the case of PALC discussed in [47]. In particular, [χ]Kh(ψ, ϕ) ↔ Kh([χ]ψ, [χ]ϕ) may not be
valid due to the lack of control in the syntax for the intermediate stages of the execution of a
plan.
taste of philosophers, maybe an empty plan is not acceptable to witness knowledge-how,
e.g., people would not say I know how to digest (by doing nothing). We can define a
stronger modality Kh+(ψ, ϕ) as Kh(ψ, ϕ) ∧ ¬U(ψ → ϕ) to rule out such cases.19 Note
that although U is definable by Kh in our setting, it does not have the philosophical
implication that knowledge-that is actually a subspecies of knowledge-how, as strong
anti-intellectulism would argue. Nevertheless, our axioms do tell us something about the
interactions between “knowing how” and “knowing that”, e.g., WSKh says some (global)
knowledge-that may let us know better how to reach our goal.
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